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Fraud Is What People Make of It: 
Election Fraud, Perceived Fraud, and Protesting in Nigeria1 
Ursula Daxecker, University of Amsterdam 
Jessica Di Salvatore, University of Warwick 
Andrea Ruggeri, University of Oxford 
 
Why do fraudulent elections encourage protesting? Scholars suggest that information about 
fraud shapes individuals’ beliefs and propensity to protest. Yet these accounts neglect the 
complexity of opinion formation and have not been tested at the individual level. We 
distinguish between the mobilizing effects of actual incidents of election fraud and individuals’ 
subjective perceptions of fraud. While rational updating models would imply that both 
measures similarly affect mobilization, we argue that subjective fraud perceptions are more 
consistent predictors of protesting, also being shaped by attitudes, information, and community 
networks. Our empirical analysis uses geo-referenced individual-level data on fraud events, 
fraud perception, and protesting from the 2007 Nigerian elections. Our analysis yields two main 
findings:  proximity to reported fraud has no effect on protesting and citizens perceiving 
elections as fraudulent are consistently more likely to protest, and more so if embedded in 
community networks.  
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Contrary to expectations of major irregularities and mass violence voiced in the run-up to the 
2015 general elections in Nigeria, the vote took place without centralized systematic fraud and 
proceeded largely peacefully (EU EOM 2015: 4, 6, 31). Opposition party candidate 
Muhammadu Buhari won the presidential election and results were quickly accepted by 
incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, bringing about the first peaceful handover of power 
by an incumbent president in Nigerian history. In comparison, massive irregularities and 
violence in earlier elections in 2007 and 2011 had triggered widespread protests and rioting 
during and after the vote (EU EOM 2007: 1-3, 6, 27; EU EOM 2011: 3, 27). At face value, this 
evidence suggests a link between the incidence of election fraud and popular mobilization, 
where elections marred by irregularities are followed by contention, whereas the absence of 
large-scale manipulation produces more stable and peaceful outcomes. The political science 
literature largely confirms such a link between electoral manipulation, on the one hand, and 
nonviolent and violent collective protest, on the other, suggesting that election fraud induces 
grievances and reveals information to citizens that combine to facilitate various types of 
collective action (Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009). Yet, while theoretical arguments 
focus on individual-level motivations, systematic empirical assessments have evaluated them 
at more aggregate levels (Hyde and Marinov 2014; Daxecker 2012). An aggregate analysis, 
though useful for highlighting general patterns, is limited in evaluating whether those engaging 
in post-election collective action are motivated by objective (i.e. experience or information) or 
subjective (i.e. perception) evaluations of electoral problems. If citizens protest because they 
perceive elections as fraudulent, rather than because they have received information about 
fraud in their vicinity, the relationship between election fraud and protesting could be subject 
to a variety of confounding factors, such as partisan or other biases. While knowing whether 
fraud perceptions, actual events, or both motivate citizens’ decision to protest thus seems 
crucial for scholarship and policy, these issues remain largely unexplored.  
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Figure 1 shows correlations in citizens’ protest participation, perceived electoral fraud, 
and fraud reported by international observers in recent African elections. To create the figure, 
we aggregate data on fraud perceptions and protesting for all countries surveyed in 
Afrobarometer rounds 1 (1999–2001), 3 (2005), and 4 (2008), and combine them with 
information on fraud reported in most recent elections by monitoring organizations from the 
National Elections in Democracy and Authoritarianism (NELDA) data (Hyde and Marinov 
2012) and the Quality of Elections (QED) data (Kelley and Kolev 2010).2 The resulting dataset 
includes 50 country-year observations with information on whether organizations reported 
election fraud, the percentage of respondents perceiving elections as fraudulent, and the 
percentage participating in protests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Perceived fraud, reported electoral fraud, and protest participation in African 
elections 1999–2010 
                                                 
2 To create these variables, we first transform survey questions on election quality and participation in protest into 
dichotomous measures. For election quality, the variable is coded 1 if individuals perceive previous elections as 
having major fraud or as not being free and fair at all. For protesting, the variable is coded 1 if respondents 
participated in at least one protest in the previous year. For each round and country, we then calculate the average 
percentage of fraud perception and protesting. To add information on fraud reported by international monitors, 
we match the elections about which respondents were surveyed in Afrobarometer with data on reported fraud 
from NELDA and QED. We cannot include round 2 (2004) since Afrobarometer did not ask respondents about 
fraud perception. 
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Figure 1 plots the association between fraud perception and protesting, distinguishing between 
elections with fraud reported by monitors (triangle markers) and those without (circle markers). 
The dashed fitted lines show linear predictions for cases with and without observed fraud, 
whereas the solid line shows linear predictions for all observations. The solid line indicates no 
clear association between fraud perception and protesting overall (r=-.14), and a weak negative 
correlation in cases where monitors did not detect fraud or did not observe elections (r=-.41). 
There is a moderate positive correlation between perception and protesting in observed 
elections (r=.54), which is consistent with research showing that actual fraud, in particular if 
reported by international monitors, increases post-election protest (Hyde and Marinov 2014). 
Interestingly, the Nigerian elections in 1999 reveal a third, albeit empirically rare scenario. In 
these elections, fraud was reported by international monitors, but elections were not perceived 
as fraudulent by a large percentage of the population. We note that low fraud perceptions were 
accompanied by low protesting in the 1999 elections, but hesitate to draw broader inferences, 
considering the lack of other cases in this category. Overall, Figure 1 suggests diverging 
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relationships for fraud perceptions, reported fraud, and protesting, supporting our call for 
disaggregated assessments.  
Our paper makes four contributions. First, we introduce the distinction between 
reported incidents of electoral fraud, and hence more objective,  and individual perception of 
electoral fraud, which is more subjective in comparison. The study of protest after electoral 
fraud has mostly assumed fraud to be an objective element of the rational calculus of 
mobilization, suggesting that individuals update their beliefs about fraud as a function of 
experiences with, or information about, actual fraud events. We argue that subjective 
perceptions are complex and are not simply reflections of factual information, suggesting a 
more consistent relationship between fraud perception and mobilization than between reported 
fraud and mobilization. We purposely select the Nigerian 2007 elections as a case that fits 
macro-level patterns on reported fraud and protesting (see Figure 1) because it allows us to 
establish more convincingly whether aggregate patterns reflect causal pathways at the micro 
level. In particular, we can trace and compare the effect of observational and perception-based 
measures of fraud on decisions to protest. Using disaggregated data on reported fraud by the 
European Union and domestic observers (among others), perceived fraud by citizens, and 
protesting from the 2007 Nigerian elections, our empirical findings support the importance of 
individual perceptions, confirming recent research linking individual fraud perceptions and 
protesting (Norris 2014). Yet we find no clear evidence that protest is directly motivated by 
reports of fraud incidents in citizens’ proximity, which contradicts theoretical claims made in 
the existing literature. Validations of our fraud measure show that it has expected effects on 
other attitudinal indicators, including decreasing citizens’ trust in the electoral commission. 
Moreover, we also show that our findings are not a result of measurement error or systematic 
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bias.3  In contrast, our study finds consistent effects of fraud perceptions on protesting, 
suggesting that people’s beliefs about whether fraud occurred may be subject to partisan or 
other biases rather than information about factual events. Scholars of U.S. politics are 
increasingly exploring the causes and consequences of people’s divergent beliefs about their 
political environment, including the integrity of elections, but these issues have rarely been 
examined in developing countries, despite the fact that information scarcity and politicization 
may figure even more prominently.  
Second, we explore potential reasons for the disparate findings for reported fraud and 
citizens’ fraud perception by examining a variety of confounding factors. We include support 
for losing candidates, citizens’ information levels, and individuals’ connections in the 
community to examine whether the effect of perceived fraud is conditional on these 
confounders. In contrast to other work (Robertson 2015), we do not find evidence consistent 
with a prominent alternative to the rational updating model of opinion formation, the motivated 
reasoning model. Political attitudes such as the winner–loser gap do not condition the effect of 
fraud perceptions on protesting. Similarly, we find no conditional effect for information levels, 
contradicting claims that fraud primarily mobilizes informed citizens (Norris 2014: 12). We 
find some evidence for a conditional effect of community networks. Individuals active in 
community organizations are more likely to mobilize if they perceived elections as fraudulent 
or were in the proximity of a reported fraud incidence (although the effect is weak for reported 
fraud). Hence, these findings support ample work on the importance of social embeddedness 
for mobilization (Granovetter 1985; Putnam 1994; Trejo 2012).   
Third, our findings on reported fraud and fraud perceptions are important for policy. 
Our results call into question whether reporting on election fraud by international or domestic 
                                                 
3 See appendix A2. 
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election observers affects individuals’ perceptions of election integrity – and in consequence 
their actions, such as willingness to protest - in ways these organizations seem to assume. 
Practitioners suggest that observer reports influence citizens’ fraud perceptions (Merloe 2015), 
but we would then expect that fraud perceptions and information about fraud affect protesting 
similarly. Our findings are in line with recent work showing only limited effects of observers 
on perceptions of integrity (Bush and Prather 2017). 
Fourth, our paper shows that the choice of observation-based versus perception-based 
measures is not trivial. Recent trends toward disaggregation in the study of protest and conflict 
reflect an interest in testing theoretical mechanisms at appropriate levels of analysis. Yet 
existing literature relies primarily on subnational observational data cataloguing contentious 
events, ignoring that citizens may hold widely divergent beliefs about these events (Silverman 
2018). In our study, only perception-based fraud measures produce findings consistent with 
theoretical expectations about the mobilizing effect of election fraud, whereas observation-
based measures with high subnational disaggregation do not show any significant results. 
Citizens’ decision to protest in response to fraud hence seems shaped by their subjective 
perceptions of what is happening rather than neutral assessments of fraud events.  
Elections and Collective Action  
The literature on collective action has often noted the importance of elections as triggers of 
nonviolent and violent mobilization. Elections can function as focal points that help create an 
occasion for participation in collective action (Schedler 2009; Tucker 2007; Oliver 1989). 
While elections have provoked reactive electoral mobilization in democracies, research has 
mainly focused on non-democratic states holding elections because the disconnect between the 
principles and practice of participation appears crucial in motivating mobilization (McAdam 
and Tarrow 2010; Schedler 2009). Factors argued to contribute to electoral contention are 
elections in which intimidation and election fraud are widespread (Tucker 2007; Fjelde and 
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Höglund 2016; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Trejo 2014; Daxecker 
2012), poor economic performance that induces voters to publicly express a desire for greater 
democracy (Brancati 2013), strong and effective opposition parties that help coordinate anti-
regime action (Beaulieu 2014b; Bunce and Wolchik 2010), and anti-regime protests in 
neighboring states inspiring protests (Beissinger 2007).  
While existing work thus suggests several plausible pathways linking elections to 
collective action, the mechanisms linking electoral processes to individuals’ decisions to 
participate in potentially risky and costly nonviolent or violent mobilization are often under-
theorized. We highlight two major understudied aspects. First, how individuals perceive the 
conduct of elections influences protest dynamics, but whether participation is affected 
primarily by subjective perception of fraud or instead proximity to actual reported fraud is 
ignored in the literature. Second, we assess how fraud (real or perceived) can affect 
mechanisms of mobilization. Since large-scale protests or violence cannot occur without the 
participation of many individuals, a focus on opposition parties, for example, relies on the 
implicit assumption that parties can mobilize voters at will and fails to consider whether, and 
how, individuals’ responses to elite behavior vary. Work that more clearly considers individual 
incentives to participate, such as arguments on how fraud aggrieves voters, or how individuals’ 
desire for democracy is shaped by economic conditions, is better able to theorize individual 
motivations. Yet systematic empirical analyses of individual-level explanations assess the 
incidence of collective action in the aggregate by examining the yearly number of protests 
during elections, or the level of violence per election (Brancati 2013; Hyde and Marinov 2014; 
von Borzyskowski 2013; Trejo 2014; Daxecker 2012). This “center-centered” focus of 
scholarship on electoral protest neglects significant subnational variation in the incidence of 
election fraud and protesting (Lankina 2015). Importantly, an analysis aggregated to the 
election country-year cannot tell us whether people turning out to protest are motivated by 
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fraud events, fraud perceptions, or both. Explicit theorizing on fraud as a motivation for 
protesting and systematic empirical tests at the individual level is thus missing in the literature 
on electoral mobilization.  
 
From Election Fraud to Protesting: Explaining Individual Incentives  
Why do elections, and particularly fraudulent elections, affect citizens’ decisions to protest?4 
Scholars have noted that the introduction of elections produces a desire for the expressive 
benefits of voting even in non-democratic regimes (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). As Schedler 
puts it, electoral authoritarian regimes “institute the principle of popular consent, even as they 
subvert it in practice,” yet thereby endowing “citizens with normative as well as institutional 
resources” (2009: 388) that can be utilized to engage in collective protest. Fraudulent elections 
can thus function as focal points for collective action, facilitating coordination and allowing 
discontent with the system to crystallize into electoral mobilization (Schedler 2009; Tucker 
2007).  
 
Proximity to Fraud and Mobilization 
Election fraud represents one moment in which the tension between the principle and practice 
of popular consent in electoral regimes should be most apparent to citizens. The gap between 
what is institutionally and practically possible is arguably greatest when voters’ consent is 
violated blatantly, widely, and openly, as in elections where intimidation and fraud run 
rampant. It is thus intuitively plausible to expect that those in the immediate vicinity of election 
fraud would be more likely to express their discontent by protesting and participating in 
                                                 
4 Other work has examined the effect of fraud perceptions on turnout (Birch 2010). 
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collective action.5 Being close to actual fraud events may capture two dynamics: first, a higher 
risk of actual individual experience with election irregularities; and second, a higher probability 
of acquiring information about fraud through acquaintances or the local media. With regard to 
individual experience, voters who suffer from threats or acts of intimidation, who are prevented 
from voting, who are pressured to sell their vote, or who observe ballot stuffing should 
experience more grievances and thus be more likely to mobilize (Kuntz and Thompson 2009).6 
With regard to information, those close to actual fraud should be more likely to find out about 
it, whether through acquaintances or the media. Increasingly certain beliefs about fraud 
subsequently alter individuals’ cost-benefit calculation, increasing their confidence in the 
likelihood of a protest being successful (Tucker 2007; Little 2012).7 Moreover, information 
about fraud can spread to other communities once evidence on fraud is reported in the local 
media.8  
                                                 
5 The subnational incidence of fraud is likely strategic. Yet while theoretical work predicts that swing voters 
should be targeted with fraud; empirical evidence has not produced consistent findings, thus not providing clear 
guidance on the subnational determinants of fraud (Mares and Young 2016).   
6 Our data from the EU EOM report includes more than 600 instances of election fraud, discussed in detail in the 
empirical section. 
7 This informational mechanism on fraud and protesting draws on threshold models of protest by Kuran (1991; 
1978).  
8 Arguably, information about fraud can also spread to more distant locations through other channels such as cell 
phones, the national or international media, or opposition parties. For example, international election-monitoring 
organizations such as the EU publish post-election statements immediately after elections and more detailed 
reports just a few months later. Similarly, opposition parties could mobilize voters nationally in response to 
fraudulent elections. While we cannot rule out that mobilization also occurs through more aggregate channels, it 
seems implausible to expect no effect for local fraud incidence, especially for serious fraud events or those 
affecting large areas and lots of individuals. In empirical models (figure 4 & table 3), we also examine interactions 
between opposition support, citizen information levels, and fraud incidence. These models fail to show that only 
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 Proximity to fraud events, then, should be linked to a greater propensity for protesting 
because it means citizens may have experienced fraud first-hand or because they receive 
information about its incidence. The first hypothesis thus posits that proximity to observed 
fraud leads to collective protest. Below, we also examine possible conditional effects.  
 
H1: Individuals in the proximity of reported fraud are more likely to protest.  
 
Fraud Perception and Mobilization 
We proceed to discussing how citizens’ subjective perception of election fraud affects 
mobilization. On the one hand, prominent models of opinion updating expect that new 
information affects individual perceptions in unbiased and efficient ways (Gerber and Green 
1999). For election fraud, this model suggests that individuals rationally update their beliefs 
when information about irregularities – whether through personal experience or the media – 
becomes available. Existing arguments on fraud and mobilization indeed imply that individuals update their perception of 
elections in response to credible information about fraud (Tucker 2007; Hyde and Marinov 2014), but these effects have 
not been established at the individual level (Bush 2015).9 Practitioners similarly suggest that information 
about election fraud from journalists, citizen monitors, and domestic and international 
observers affects citizens’ perceptions of elections, although recent experimental work 
establishes only modest individual-level effects (Bush and Prather 2017). Hence, according to 
                                                 
informed individuals or those supporting the opposition mobilize in the face of election fraud, which is 
inconsistent with claims on the predominance of aggregate effects.  
9 Brancati (2014) examines the individual-level effects of international election monitoring on citizen perceptions 
of electoral integrity, but the experimental treatment provides information about observers’ responsibilities rather 
than whether, or how much, fraud was detected in elections. Norris (2013) shows congruence between expert and 
citizen perceptions of electoral integrity, but aggregates individual perceptions. 
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the rational updating model, individuals’ subjective perception of elections as fraudulent 
should primarily be a function of knowing about fraud and affect mobilization in ways similar 
to proximity of fraud discussed above: citizens mobilize when information about fraud 
incidents becomes available.10  
On the other hand, subjective fraud perceptions may be more complex than simply 
being a function of actual fraud. They could be shaped by preexisting expectations of fraud, 
political attitudes on democracy more broadly, support for the losing party, among others. For 
example, the motivated reasoning model suggests that individuals systematically disregard 
information that is inconsistent with preexisting conceptions (Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and 
Taber 2013), suggesting that only those supporting the opposition would form fraud 
perceptions and protest. Below, we develop some of these possible conditional effects, but we 
first examine whether fraud perceptions have a direct effect on protesting.  Since we examine 
the effect of proximity to fraud separately in the hypothesis 1, empirical results for the 
hypotheses will help determine the relative importance of actual versus perceived fraud in 
mobilizing individuals.11  
 
H2: Individuals who perceive elections as fraudulent are more likely to protest.  
 
Conditional Effects  
                                                 
10 Incumbents have an advantage in carrying out fraud, raising the possibility that areas with many irregularities 
are those where the state has greater coercive capacity, which could counter the mobilizing effect of fraud. To 
make sure that results on reported fraud are not influenced by state coercive capacity, our empirical models control 
for state presence.  
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We have outlined direct effects of proximity to fraud and fraud perceptions in hypothesis 1&2.  
However, a host of confounding relationships could also shape fraud perceptions or the effect 
of reported fraud on protesting, including the winner-loser gap, citizens’ information levels, 
and individuals’ connections in the community.  
First, in contrast to rational updating, work on motivated reasoning finds that citizens’ 
political orientation influences how information is acquired and processed, with the result that 
reports of election fraud increase fraud perception only for those already opposed to 
incumbents (Robertson 2015). Others have shown that those supporting losing candidates 
generally assess elections more critically (Birch 2008; Cantú and García-Ponce 2015; Beaulieu 
2014a), suggesting that a winner–loser gap shapes fraud perceptions. This gap implies that 
fraud perceptions mobilize only those who supported losing candidates. Similarly, for 
proximity of fraud, those supporting the winning candidate may not mobilize in response to 
fraud.  
Second, since citizens’ have varying access to credible information about the incidence 
of fraud, the effect of fraud events but also fraud perceptions should be more pronounced in 
individuals with frequent media access or those most informed about politics (Kerr 2013: 828; 
Norris 2014: 14). The effect of fraud on protesting might thus be conditional on access to 
quality information about its incidence.  
Finally, whether citizens’ mobilize when experiencing or perceiving fraud may also 
depend on whether they are active in civil society organizations (Trejo 2012; Boulding 2014). 
Such networks can lower the risk of mobilization and facilitate coordination, which would 
suggest that fraud perceptions have a stronger mobilizing effect on individuals with close ties 
to community organizations 
Hence, our third hypothesis examines conditional effects of proximity to fraud and 
fraud perceptions on mobilization.  
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H3a: The effect of proximity to fraud and fraud perceptions on protesting should be 
more pronounced for individuals who voted for the losing party. 
 
H3b: The effect of proximity to fraud and fraud perceptions on protesting should be 
more pronounced for individuals informed about politics. 
 
H3c: The effect of proximity to fraud and fraud perceptions on protesting should be 
more pronounced for individuals who are active local community members. 
 
Research Design 
Case Selection: Elections and Fraud in Nigeria 
In Figure 1, we provided a first-cut analysis of reported fraud, fraud perception, and protesting 
at the election country-year level in Africa. While we argue that theoretical mechanisms need 
to be assessed at the micro-level, we aim to select a case that fits existing arguments and macro-
level evidence. The 2007 elections in Nigeria are very close to the regression line in Figure 1 
and thus represent the most likely scenario for findings on fraud and protesting in the existing 
literature (Hyde and Marinov 2014). Hence, if we are facing an inferential fallacy due to data 
overaggregation (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009), selecting a case on the regression line of the 
aggregate data allows us to test quantitatively the assumed theoretical mechanisms, 
distinguishing perceived and reported fraud at the individual level.   
In addition, Nigeria is a useful test case because it is not a consolidated democracy: it 
frequently experiences electoral manipulation and contention over electoral outcomes. In 2007, 
Nigerian citizens voted for state assembly elections on April 14 and for general assembly and 
president on April 21. The two largest parties were the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
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and the opposition party All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). The PDP won in most states and 
its presidential candidate Umaru Yar'Adua received 69.8% of votes compared to 18.7% for 
ANPP candidate Muhammadu Buhari. Election fraud was widespread in both elections and 
involved both parties, as described in the EU report (EU EOM 2007). Incidents ranged from 
problems with the voter registration process, violence and intimidation of voters during the 
campaign, the theft and stuffing of ballot boxes in many areas, the intimidation of voters on 
election day, and extensive vote-buying (Kerr 2013; Osumah and Aghemelo 2010; Rawlence 
and Albin-Lackey 2007).    
Acts of intimidation and fraud were furthermore spread across different social strata, 
rural and urban areas, and gender (Bratton 2008). This widespread incidence of fraud ensures 
that we can empirically examine how individuals’ exposure to fraud affected their propensity 
to engage in collective action.12 Nigerians mobilized in significant numbers in response to the 
flawed electoral process. Protests and riots were reported in many villages and towns as result 
of the national elections’ outcome,13 but also in large cities such as Lagos, Kano, Abuja, Port 
Harcourt, across entire states (Ekiti, Kano, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers), or even regions, in 
particular the Southwest (Omotola 2010). Post-electoral mobilization involved a variety of 
actors, including regular citizens, civil society organizations such as women’s and labor groups, 
and opposition parties (EU EOM 2007; Omotola 2010).  
                                                 
12 While citizens were subject to extensive electoral manipulation, the vast majority did not accept these tactics as 
legitimate or simply part of the political process. In a study of the 2007 elections, Bratton (2008: 622–623) finds 
that only 7% of Nigerians considered vote-buying “not wrong at all”, and even fewer, 5%, strongly supported the 
use of violence for political goals. Further, voters quite often reject vote-buying offers (Bratton 2008). It thus 
seems reasonable to assume that Nigerians value voting for its expressive benefits and do not see it simply as a 
struggle over access to resources. 
13 The EU EOM reports protests after the 21 April elections and BBC also reports protests in Lagos on the day 
the president sworn. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6699337.stm. 
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To show the generalizability of our findings beyond Nigeria, the appendix presents 
models of fraud perception and protesting for all African countries using data on respondents 
in Afrobarometer rounds 1, 3, and 4 (table A7). We show that the positive effect of fraud 
perception on individual mobilization holds for all countries surveyed in Afrobarometer. 
Data and Variables 
We create a dataset with all respondents from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer survey in 
Nigeria (Afrobarometer 2008). Using respondents as the unit of analysis makes it possible to 
empirically test the mechanisms linking fraudulent elections to protest at the individual level. 
The survey was conducted in May 2008, that is, just over a year after the elections took place 
in April 2007. The sample consists of 2,325 individuals. The survey includes information about 
the state, district, and town or village of each respondent. We used this information to assign 
geographical coordinates to respondents at the lowest level of aggregation, i.e., the town or 
village. Approximately half of the towns were correctly identified using automated geocoding, 
while others were manually geocoded using sources such as gazetteers, interactive maps, or 
online depositories of geographic coordinates.14 Town or village coordinates were retrieved for 
2,225 respondents, but the remaining 100 respondents could not be coded and are thus not 
included in the analyses. These respondents are located in 230 of 775 local government areas 
(LGAs), the second-order administrative unit, in Nigeria.15  
Data from the survey were used to create the dependent variable and several covariates. 
The dependent variable is a dummy measuring individuals’ participation in protests and/or 
                                                 
14 We use the Stata package GEOCODE3 to automatically retrieve coordinates using the name of locations. Other 
sources used can be found at itouchmap.com/latlong.html, postalcodedb.com/, http://geopostcodes.com/ 
15 Afrobarometer uses clustered sampling. 
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demonstrations over the past year.16 The variable is coded 1 if respondents attended one or 
more protests over the past year, 0 otherwise; 17.12% of respondents in our sample attended at 
least one protest. A limitation of this measure is that we cannot establish whether protests 
related to elections or other issues. Unfortunately, there are no alternative individual-level data 
on electoral protesting, which is why we validate the protest measure with observational data 
on electoral protests in the appendix (A1). Results establish a positive correlation between 
election-related protests from observational data and individual-level protesting. Further, the 
validation shows a positive correlation between fraud perception and electoral protests reported 
in the news, which is consistent with our individual-level findings. In the appendix (A6.5), we 
also present an extended baseline model with additional controls for education and income, 
which generally correlate with protesting. A second concern regarding our protesting variable 
(and survey data more generally) relates to social desirability, meaning that respondents might 
report protest participation and/or fraud perception to avoid interviewer disapproval. We do 
not think that our protesting measure should suffer from such bias since respondents were 
allowed to say that they did not participate, but would have liked to if they would have had the 
chance. Respondents are less likely to give socially desirable but incorrect answers when 
surveys offer face-saving alternatives (Persson and Solevid 2014). In additional analyses 
(available on request), we reran our analyses on male, younger and less-educated subsamples, 
i.e. respondents who have been shown to respond more truthfully (Preisendörfer and Wolter 
2014). We do not find patterns consistent with social desirability bias. 
                                                 
16 We use question 23C, Afrobarometer Nigeria round 4, which asks: “Here is a list of actions that people 
sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these 
things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a demonstration or protest 
march?” Answers are coded ordinally, and we code as 0 those not having attended and those indicating that they 
might if they had a chance. Only individuals having attended at least one protest are coded as 1. 
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We create two independent variables to test the hypotheses linking election fraud to protest. Our main 
explanatory variables for election fraud are (1) respondents’ proximity to fraud incidents reported in the EU EOM 
2007 election observation final report and (2) respondents’ perceptions of election fraud. Hypothesis 1 expects 
that proximity to fraud incidents induces mobilization because individuals may have experienced fraud directly 
or obtained information about fraud occurring close to them. We provide several measures of reported fraud using 
information on election-day fraud from the detailed list of incidents reported in the European Union Election 
Observation Mission final report for the 2007 elections (EU EOM 2007). The EU mission monitored both the 
state elections (14 April) and presidential elections (21 April), hence the EU final report contains fraud incidents 
occurring in both elections. The report contains 651 fraud incidents that occurred on election day, providing the 
source, location, and type (procedural breaches, violence, and classic election fraud) for each incident. In terms 
of source, the report includes events directly observed by the EU (54% of all incidents), but for the remaining 
46% relies on information from EU observer interviews with witnesses, informants whose identity was known to 
EU observers, election officials, journalists, and domestic observer organizations such as the Transition 
Monitoring Group or the Justice, Development, and Peace Commission. This variety in reporting from 
international and domestic monitoring organizations, but also journalists and eyewitnesses should help reduce the 
risk of selection bias and reporting bias. There is one exception: the EU EOM report indicates that for security 
reasons, observers could not be deployed in the states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers, and no incidents were reported 
for those states. We include a dummy variable coded 1 for these three states in all empirical models to account for 
this omission. In robustness tests (section A4), we further examine potential selection bias in the reporting of fraud 
incidents in more detail, but find no support for the most worrisome types of bias. 
 To identify the precise location of each incident, we geocode the incidents using codes 
referring to state, LGAs, wards and polling stations contained in the EU report, which we match 
with the same codes and coordinates of each polling station provided by Nigeria’s Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC).17 Precise location information is not available for all 
incidents, for two reasons. First, 37 events do not include the code or name of the polling 
stations but only provide more aggregate location information, namely the LGA. To geocode 
                                                 
17 In an email conversation, EU EOM staff confirmed the use of INEC codes. The EU EOM also provided us with 
an Excel sheet with all 118,307 polling units and coordinates from INEC.  
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these incidents, we use the coordinate of the centroid of the LGA. Second, several incidents 
affect large areas, including entire LGAs or states, in which case we code a fraud incident for 
the closest polling station for each Afrobarometer respondent in those LGAs or states. Hence, 
events affecting larger areas result in reported fraud in the closest polling station for each 
respondent. This procedure results in 651 geocoded incidents, of which 215 are breaches of 
electoral procedures (type 1), 256 are violent events (type 2), and 180 are fraud events such as 
ballot stuffing (type 3).18 We use ArcGIS to calculate several measures of Afrobarometer 
respondents’ proximity to fraud. Our main measure is a dummy coded 1 if a fraud incident was 
reported within 5km of a respondent in Afrobarometer, 0 otherwise. 22% of respondents are 
located within 5km of an incident (see table A8 for summary statistics). We selected the 5km 
threshold because it is proximate enough to plausibly expect that respondents received 
information about fraud. Furthermore, considering the distribution of polling stations in 
Nigeria, this threshold would on average encompass 50 polling stations per respondent.19 In 
the appendix (section A6.4), we examine heterogeneous effects across different types of fraud. 
More blatant or easily observable types of fraud, such as violence, may have stronger or more 
direct effects on protesting than other, less visible kinds, such as procedural breaches or ballot 
stuffing. In models distinguishing fraud type, however, we do not find evidence of meaningful 
differences. 
                                                 
18 This number is higher than the total (470) reported by the EU EOM because observers aggregate some incidents. 
For example, Incident Report No.A.15.06 aggregates fraud in 9 different LGAs as a single event.  
19 While 50 polling stations might seem like a large number, Nigeria has almost 120,000 polling stations 
because INEC aims to provide a polling station for a maximum of 500 voters within a 1km (in urban areas) and 
2km (in rural areas) radius of each voter. In our sample, respondents were on average 667 meters from a polling 
station. See appendix A3 for additional discussion; again our results are not sensitive to the 5km-threshold 
selected. 
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There are two concerns regarding our measure of proximity to fraud. First, it expects 
homogenous effects on mobilization, regardless of respondent’s settlement type. Yet proximity 
to fraud events in sparsely populated rural areas could imply that information about fraud is 
shared more rapidly across a smaller group of people. A second concern is that we do not have 
precise location information for Afrobarometer respondents and instead rely on the centroids 
of respondents’ villages, towns, or cities.20  In large cities, this could be problematic because it 
might mean that respondents are further from fraud than our measure indicates. In robustness 
tests, we also experimented with shorter distance thresholds and interacted proximity measures 
and respondent settlement type (see Appendix A2.4). Our main findings on perceived fraud 
remain robust. 
We create several additional operationalizations of proximity to reported fraud. We 
create additional dummies for fraud incidents within 10 and 20 km from a respondent. We also 
calculate three distance-based measures. First, we calculate individuals’ average distance to the 
three incidents closest to them. Second, we do the same for the five closest fraud incidents. 
Third, we measure individuals’ distance from fraud (in km). Distance varies from few meters 
to more than 190km, but more than 94% of respondents are within 100km of an incident. 
A crucial point is to show the validity of our operationalization based on proximity to 
fraud. Thanks to an unusual amount of detail from a single report, we validate our measure by 
establishing other observable implications before utilizing it in empirical models. If proximity 
to fraud indeed captures individuals’ experience with, or knowledge of, events of election 
fraud, we would expect that those close to incidents have less trust in the Nigerian electoral 
commission (INEC), which was broadly condemned for its failure to provide a free and fair 
electoral process in 2007. Afrobarometer includes a question asking respondents about their 
                                                 
20 Afrobarometer does not share exact coordinates for respondents to protect respondents’ anonymity. 
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trust in INEC. We create a dummy coded 1 if a respondent trusts INEC “somewhat” or “a lot”, 
0 otherwise.  
We include the same controls as in models of protesting, except for the temporal and 
spatial lag of protesting. The coefficient plot below (figure 2, full results in table A2.1 in 
Appendix) reports the results and shows that individuals within 5, 10, or 20 km of reported 
fraud are less likely to trust INEC. Similarly, the positive coefficients of distance-based 
measures suggest that the further away respondents are from fraud incidents, the more likely 
they are to trust INEC. This evidence shows that proximity to fraud does affect perceptions, 
robustly and in ways we would expect.  If proximity to fraud was capturing a variety of factors 
unrelated to fraud, we would not observe these meaningful reductions in trust for electoral 
institutions. Hence, this exercise strengthens the validity of our reported fraud measures by 
confirming their expected effects on respondents’ trust in electoral institutions as captured in 
the Afrobarometer survey. The appendix (section A2) provides additional validations of the 
proximity to fraud measure. 
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Figure 2. Coefficient Plot, Trust for INEC as Dependent Variable (Table A2.1) 
 
 
We proceed to discussing fraud perceptions, the second main independent variable. Hypothesis 
2 expects that protests are motivated by citizens’ perceptions of election fraud. We code 
citizens’ perception of fraudulent elections with a dummy using respondents’ answers to the 
following question (Q71): “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the 
last national election, held in 2007?” We code fraud perception as 1 if respondents say elections 
have been “not free and fair” or “free and fair, but with major problems”. More than 67% of 
the respondents in the sample evaluated the election as fraudulent, while 32% thought they 
were free and fair or had only minor problems (see table A8 with descriptive statistics in the 
appendix). In robustness tests, we control for additional grievances to ensure that fraud 
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perceptions do not simply reflect other economic, ethnic, or other political grievances (table 
A6.2).21  
Figure 3 depicts the geographical distribution of fraud perception and fraud incidents 
across LGAs in Nigeria. For fraud perception, LGAs with darker shades represent a higher 
percentage of respondents perceiving fraud. For fraud incidents, we show the number of all 
types of fraud incidents for each LGA. Note that LGAs in the lightest shade of gray are those 
without respondents in round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey. 
Our third hypothesis argued that the effect of fraud (real or perceived) could be 
conditional on other factors. Partisan biases, access to information, and community networks 
could affect whether perceive elections as fraudulent, and an effect of perception could thus be 
conditional on these attitudes. Similarly, people close to fraud events might mobilize only if 
they supported losers, are informed, or are active in their community. To examine whether 
these confounders affect the estimated effect of fraud, we code three additional variables from 
the Afrobarometer survey that we include as controls in all models, but also interact them with 
proximity to fraud and fraud perception (figure 4, table 3). First, we use information on vote 
choice to capture the “win-loss status” identified as influential in shaping fraud perceptions 
                                                 
21 Another concern with our fraud perception measure is that network effects from protesting could affect fraud 
perceptions, rather than the other way around. We control for community membership in all models to control for 
such network effects. As an alternative (results not shown), we also added a control variable for respondents who 
often discuss politics with friends and family. Our main results unchanged. Moreover, in additional specifications 
(not shown), we aggregated data to the LGA level to see if protests and fraud perception in the future (April 2008) 
predict expectations of fraudulent elections among respondents of an LGA in the past (Jan-Feb 2007). We find 
that LGAs with higher expectations of fraudulent elections before the polling had more respondents perceiving 
fraud after elections, but these LGAs were not more likely to experience protests. This suggests that anticipating 
fraud was not enough to mobilize individuals after elections, providing some evidence against a purely post-hoc 
rationalization of protesting and fraud perceptions. 
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(Robertson 2015).22 Unfortunately, Afrobarometer did not ask respondents about their vote 
choice in 2007, but asked which party they would vote for “if presidential elections were held 
tomorrow.” We use respondents’ answers to this question to code whether they did or did not 
vote for the incumbent, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Only 43% of the respondents 
declared they would vote for the PDP.23 
Figure 3. Relative frequency of respondents perceiving fraud and number of fraud 
incidents reported by EU EOM by LGA 
 
The variable is coded 1 if respondents indicate that they would not vote for the PDP, since that 
implies they likely supported a losing party in 2007. Second, not all individuals have equal 
                                                 
22 It would be interesting to also examine the partisan orientation of localities because elites may strategically 
employ fraud in strongholds in order to reduce mobilization potential or the costs of fraud. Unfortunately, 
disaggregated data on electoral support are not available and could not easily be included in the analysis because 
respondents are not subnationally representative.  
23 Official results show the PDP’s Yar’Adua winning with 69,8% in 2007, but given the massive cheating, this 
figure should not be taken as actual PDP support.   
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access to information or interest in political processes, meaning the effect of fraud as a 
coordination device may be conditional on individuals’ access to information. In the survey, 
78% of respondents owned a radio, while only 58% has a television (55% has both). We thus 
create a dummy for individuals who listen to radio news every day (58.6%).  Third, citizens 
with strong ties in the community may be more likely to act on fraud since these communities 
will mobilize them to contest the electoral outcome. A dichotomous variable is used to identify 
individuals who are active members of religious groups or other community-based 
associations. Active community members amount to 58% of the sample.  
We control for several other factors that could affect mobilization, fraud perception, 
and/or proximity to fraud. Using round 4 of Afrobarometer, we begin with individual 
characteristics, controlling for the age of respondents, whether they are from urban areas, and 
whether they voted in the 2007 elections. We then control for an indicator at the census 
enumerator area (EA) level (the smallest administrative unit used by the national census), 
namely whether most houses in an EA have access to electricity. We also control for the 
(logged) number of polling stations within a respondent’s LGA since the number of stations 
close by could affect both individuals’ propensity to find out about fraud and the likelihood of 
mobilization. There were more than 118,000 polling stations in Nigeria for 2007 elections, with 
a mean of 232 per LGA. The map in the appendix shows the distribution and density of the 
polling booths (figure A3). We also include a dummy variable for the three states that were not 
visited by EU observers for security reasons (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers).  
Additional controls for government coercive capacity, living conditions, expectations 
of election fraud, previous protesting, spatial diffusion of protesting are created with historical 
measures from the Afrobarometer round 3.5 conducted in January–February 2007. A major 
challenge for creating these historical variables is that the sample of respondents changes in 
Afrobarometer with each round. We therefore aggregate information for respondents in round 
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3.5 to the LGA level and assign values to round 4 respondents for the same LGA for all LGAs 
surveyed in both rounds. Because Afrobarometer uses clustered sampling, an additional 
challenge is that the LGAs included in the two rounds are not identical. When a respondent’s 
LGA in round 4 was not surveyed in round 3.5, we calculated the spatial lag of the above-
mentioned variables, hence to have geographically similar values, from round 3.5 and used it 
to replace unmatched LGAs in 4. A detailed discussion of the construction of these variables 
is provided in section A4 in the appendix. From round 3.5, we thus include a dummy variable 
for LGAs experiencing protests, a dummy for police presence, two ordinal measures of past 
living conditions and individuals’ expectations of fraud in the 2007 election, and the spatial lag 
of protesting to account for spatial interdependencies.24 Table A8 in Appendix presents 
descriptive statistics for all variables. We use logistic regression with LGA clustered standard 
errors to estimate the effect of perceived and actual electoral fraud on the likelihood of protests. 
While not all of our variables are measured at the individual level, we cannot specify multilevel 
models because Afrobarometer only oversamples the South-South region of Nigeria and the 
number of respondents within LGAs is strongly unbalanced, varying from 1 (Karaye, in the 
North) to 46 (Port Harcourt, in the South). We include respondents’ survey weights in the 
logistic regression to account for selection probabilities and oversampling. 
Results 
We proceed to testing hypotheses 1 and 2 and present results in table 1. We estimate three 
baseline models. In the first two models, we include perceived fraud and reported fraud 
separately; in Model 3, both are included in the specification. Table 1 shows that perceived 
fraud positively affects individuals’ odds of mobilization (models 1 and 3), while reported 
fraud has a positive but insignificant effect (models 2 and 3).  
                                                 
24 Living conditions range from very good (1) to very bad (4), while the electoral fraud expectation variable ranges 
from 1 (not fair, not free) to 4 (completely free). 
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Table 1 About Here 
We next explore hypothesis 1 on reported fraud in more detail. In the baseline models, reported 
fraud is measured with a dummy coded 1 if a respondent was within 5 km of a fraud incident. 
To make sure this insignificant result is not a result of this particular operationalization, we 
estimate a set of models with other measures of reported fraud. Coefficients for Models 4–8 
are shown in Table 2, and show that regardless of the operationalization – fraud incidents within 
10 or 20km, average distance from three or five closest incidents, or km distance from closest 
fraud – we find no significant coefficients for reported fraud.  Even when conducting additional 
robustness tests that distinguish event types (e.g. breaches of electoral procedures, violence and 
ballot stuffing), there is no significant effect of reported fraud (see Table A6.4 in Appendix). 
Since other work shows that violence, for example, is used primarily to deter turnout from 
opponents (Bratton 2008), is unlikely that fraud has an insignificant effect on protesting 
because it was used primarily in incumbent strongholds.25 Only distance from closest fraud 
event reports a statistically significant, positive coefficient, counterintuitively suggesting that 
those further away from fraud become more mobilized, but this result is driven by outliers. 
Only 8% of respondents are more than 100 km away from a fraud incident; when these are 
removed from the estimation (results not shown), the coefficient for distance is insignificant. 
We thus find no empirical support for hypothesis 1, over different possible operationalizations, 
and the effect of proximity to fraud on individuals’ decision to protest. In contrast, fraud 
perception has a positive and significant effect across all models in Table 2. In substantive 
                                                 
25 In the case of Nigeria, we find that most instances of fraud did not occur in states that strongly supported the 
incumbent party (PDP). Scatterplots (not included) show that state-level vote shares for the PDP do not correlate 
with the number of fraud incidents reported by the EU (corr=-0.08).  
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terms, models show that the odds of mobilization increase between 37% and 42% for 
respondents perceiving elections as fraudulent.  
Table 2 About Here 
The results in tables 1 and 2 show robust evidence for the mobilizing effect of perception, but 
no evidence that proximity to fraud affects protesting. We proceed to examining whether the 
omission of important conditional effects might explain these differing findings for fraud 
perception and reported fraud. As discussed, potential political grievances resulting from 
having voted for losing party, information available to respondents, or citizen links within local 
community could condition how fraud perceptions affect mobilization. Moreover, these 
confounders could also explain why reported fraud alone does not affect individuals’ 
participation to protests.  
Table 3 About Here 
Table 3 presents models where we interact variables for loser vote, information, and 
community links with both fraud perception and reported fraud measures, testing the third 
hypothesis. For ease of interpretation, figure 4 plots marginal effects for interactions between 
fraud perception, reported fraud, and confounders. For fraud perceptions (top panel), we find 
support only for the conditional effect of community networks (hypothesis 3c). As figure 4 
shows, community membership does not increase protest propensities for individuals who do 
not perceive fraud. Yet for individuals perceiving elections as fraudulent, they are more likely 
to protest if they are also active within their local communities. There is no evidence of similar 
effects on fraud perceptions for win-loss status or informed individuals. We find similar results 
for reported fraud (figure 4, bottom panel). Having voted for electoral losers and paying 
attention to the media do not alter the effect of reported fraud on mobilization.26 We find weak 
                                                 
26 The effect of information on perceived and reported fraud remains the same when we operationalize information 
with a dummy for respondents’ interest in political issues (results not shown). 
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evidence of a conditional effect for community membership. While the interaction term is not 
significant, figure 4 shows that respondents active in communities have higher odds of 
mobilization when fraud is reported in their proximity, weakly supporting hypothesis 3c. 
Reported fraud and community membership are mutually reinforcing and increase 
respondents’ likelihood to protest. This interaction effect, however, seems to be driven by 
community membership more than proximity to fraud, since those active in communities 
mobilize more even in the absence of proximate fraud events. Findings from interactions also 
question claims prioritizing aggregate over local effects of fraud. If fraud perceptions or 
reported fraud are diffused nationally through media or opposition parties, we would expect 
support for these conditional effects. 
Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of Conditional Effects (Table 3) 
 
 
 
Additional Robustness Tests  
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In additional robustness tests discussed in detail in the supporting materials, we validate our 
dependent variable with observational data on electoral protest (A1), present additional 
validations of reported fraud (section A2), show a map of polling station locations and densities 
(A3), discuss the possibility of selection bias in the reporting of fraud events in the EU report 
(A4), and outline the construction of lagged variables from Afrobarometer round 3.5 (A5). The 
appendix also presents additional models of protesting to examine interaction effects between 
observed and perceived fraud (A6, table A6.1), control for economic, ethnic, or political 
grievances (A6, table A6.2), show models at the LGA rather than the individual level (A6, table 
A6.3), explore different reported fraud types (A6, table A6.4), and present an extended baseline 
model that controls for individuals’ education level and income (A6, table A6.5). Finally, to 
assess generalizability, we report the effect of perceptions and reported fraud using 
Afrobarometer surveys for all African countries (A7). These robustness tests confirm the 
findings presented in the manuscript, while addressing possible concerns with regard to our 
inferences. 
 
Conclusion 
The mobilizing potential of fraudulent elections is the subject of a growing literature. We depart 
from existing studies by examining the effects of election fraud on protest participation at the 
individual level. This emphasis on individuals addresses a mismatch between disaggregated 
theory and over-aggregated empirical evidence in previous work. While theories focus on how 
election fraud provides information crucial for citizen coordination, or produces grievances in 
voters that function as mobilizing shocks, empirical studies examine the effect of aggregate, 
election-level fraud assessments rather than individual assessments. For our individual-level 
analysis, we purposely select a case that fits aggregate patterns established in the literature. As 
Figure 1 at the beginning of the article shows, the 2007 Nigerian elections are close to the 
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regression line, having been assessed as fraudulent by international and domestic observers and 
experiencing substantial post-election mobilization. Choosing such a case allows us to 
quantitatively assess two distinct pathways linking election fraud to mobilization. We 
distinguish between the mobilizing effects of reported and observational (and perhaps 
relatively more objective) measures of election fraud, and individuals’ perception (and hence 
relatively more subjective) measures of fraud. Our results from the 2007 elections in Nigeria 
show that only fraud perceptions have a positive and consistent effect on protesting, whereas 
proximity to fraud documented by observers does not affect mobilization. Fraud perception 
thus has strong and consistent effects on mobilization at the individual level in Nigeria, yet this 
pattern cannot be identified with aggregate data. Conversely, fraud reported by observers 
weakly correlates with protesting in the aggregate, yet we cannot identify individual-level 
effects.  
We highlight three implications of our findings. First, we show that inferring citizens’ 
perceptions of the electoral process from macro-level assessments is problematic. While 
scholars and organizations active in election monitoring have suggested that the documentation 
of electoral problems affects citizens’ perceptions, our evidence shows that being close to 
documented fraud incidents has no effect on protesting. In contrast, we find strong and 
consistent effects of fraud perceptions on protesting at the individual level. These findings are 
potentially worrisome for policymakers but also normative reasons, since they could imply that 
people’s fraud perceptions are shaped by a variety of biases or preexisting beliefs, rather than 
stemming from objective interpretations of events. Fraud documented by observers could still 
affect protesting through the behavior of elites, such as convincing opposition parties of 
international support when deciding whether to protest fraudulent elections, but these are 
alternative causal pathways. Second, the lack of congruence between aggregate and individual-
level patterns supports the call for disaggregation and a better match between theory and 
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empirics in the literature on contention (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009). However, our results 
indicate that even highly disaggregated indicators from observational data can produce quite 
different results than perception-based measures of the same concept. Inferring citizens’ beliefs 
from observational indicators alone could thus be quite problematic. Third, our findings fail to 
support the rational updating model of opinion formation but also its primary competitor, the 
motivated reasoning model. We find no evidence that information about fraud events leads to 
the updating of individuals’ beliefs, nor do our results show that partisan attitudes condition 
individuals’ fraud perceptions and mobilization. We thus need to develop models of opinion 
formation in unconsolidated democracies. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Baseline models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Perceived Fraud 0.377*  0.382* 
 0.185  0.186 
Fraud Incident <=5km  0.270 0.318 
  0.243 0.242 
Radio News 0.164 0.182 0.162 
 0.184 0.183 0.184 
Community Member 0.912* 0.935* 0.915* 
 0.193 0.190 0.195 
Loser Vote -0.381* -0.283+ -0.351* 
 0.163 0.165 0.168 
Not Observed 0.504* 0.559* 0.603* 
 0.217 0.249 0.233 
Age 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 0.007 0.006 0.006 
Urban Respondent -0.085 -0.143 -0.116 
 0.211 0.202 0.204 
Access Electricity 0.493 0.537+ 0.471 
 0.310 0.311 0.317 
Voted Elections 0.104 0.066 0.109 
 0.193 0.191 0.193 
Police Presence t-1 -0.150 -0.164 -0.145 
 0.260 0.255 0.257 
Protest t-1 0.306 0.257 0.278 
 0.270 0.278 0.267 
 Expect Unfair Election t-1 0.223 0.255+ 0.211 
 0.149 0.145 0.147 
Bad Living Condition t-1 0.036 0.029 0.040 
 0.111 0.113 0.111 
SpLag Protest 0.721 0.762 0.678 
 0.504 0.490 0.500 
Polling Stations (log) -0.294+ -0.349* -0.326* 
 0.155 0.155 0.159 
Constant -1.970* -1.602+ -1.826* 
 0.873 0.820 0.897 
Observations 1280 1330 1280 
AIC 1198.626 1231.004 1197.697 
BIC 1281.100 1314.091 1285.326 
Standard errors clustered on LGA in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 2. Reported fraud operationalizations 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Perceived Fraud 0.376* 0.377* 0.409* 0.427* 0.391* 
 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.187 0.183 
Fraud Incident <=5km      
      
Fraud Incident <=10km -0.094     
 0.215     
Fraud Incident <=20km  0.003    
  0.191    
Avg. Distance 3 Incidents   0.003   
   0.002   
Avg. Distance 5 Incidents    0.003+  
    0.002  
Distance Closest Incident     0.004+ 
     0.002 
Radio News 0.162 0.164 0.156 0.155 0.151 
 0.183 0.183 0.184 0.183 0.183 
Community Member 0.911* 0.912* 0.924* 0.937* 0.920* 
 0.192 0.193 0.190 0.188 0.190 
Loser Vote -0.389* -0.381* -0.406* -0.406* -0.411* 
 0.165 0.164 0.163 0.165 0.167 
Not Observed 0.468* 0.505* 0.354 0.358 0.417+ 
 0.228 0.227 0.241 0.233 0.214 
Age 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Urban Respondent -0.072 -0.085 -0.045 -0.037 -0.042 
 0.205 0.202 0.210 0.211 0.207 
Access Electricity 0.506 0.493 0.532+ 0.525+ 0.550+ 
 0.311 0.312 0.302 0.299 0.292 
Voted Elections 0.107 0.104 0.098 0.096 0.101 
 0.194 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.194 
Police Presencet-1 -0.147 -0.150 -0.142 -0.140 -0.152 
 0.260 0.261 0.262 0.261 0.264 
Protestt-1 0.315 0.306 0.362 0.401 0.357 
 0.278 0.280 0.278 0.282 0.283 
Expect Unfair Electiont-1 0.222 0.223 0.235 0.232 0.235 
 0.150 0.149 0.151 0.152 0.150 
Bad Living Conditiont-1 0.037 0.036 0.021 0.013 0.031 
 0.111 0.111 0.110 0.109 0.111 
SpLag Protest 0.750 0.720 0.777 0.766 0.771 
 0.515 0.513 0.506 0.499 0.507 
Polling Stations (log) -0.285+ -0.294+ -0.278+ -0.279+ -0.260+ 
 0.156 0.155 0.151 0.152 0.151 
Constant -2.009* -1.971* -2.318* -2.382* -2.392* 
 0.874 0.873 0.857 0.861 0.837 
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
AIC 1200.328 1200.626 1198.502 1197.346 1196.822 
BIC 1287.957 1288.254 1286.131 1284.975 1284.450 
Standard errors clustered on LGA in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 3. Interactions with loser vote, information, and community  
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Perceived Fraud  0.308 0.374* 0.715* 0.377* 0.069 0.392* 
  0.232 0.186 0.305 0.186 0.326 0.186 
Fraud Incident <=5km  0.317 0.144 0.317 0.001 0.325 -0.150 
  0.242 0.265 0.242 0.388 0.241 0.430 
Loser Vote  -0.458+ -0.445* -0.356* -0.345* -0.357* -0.355* 
  0.263 0.183 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 
Perceived*Loser Vote  0.159      
  0.327      
Reported*Loser Vote   0.375     
   0.436     
Radio News  0.164 0.172 0.505+ 0.043 0.171 0.155 
  0.184 0.182 0.305 0.220 0.185 0.184 
Perceived*Radio    -0.507    
    0.361    
Reported*Radio     0.492   
     0.398   
Community member  0.913* 0.913* 0.905* 0.911* 0.628+ 0.771* 
  0.195 0.195 0.194 0.194 0.325 0.223 
Perceived*Community      0.413  
      0.401  
Reported*Community       0.626 
       0.438 
Not Observed  0.000 0.582* 0.598* 0.599* 0.000 0.615* 
  . 0.231 0.230 0.230 . 0.233 
Age  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 
  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Urban Respondent  -0.122 -0.127 -0.109 -0.117 -0.121 -0.121 
  0.205 0.203 0.203 0.204 0.205 0.204 
Access Electricity  0.466 0.468 0.473 0.484 0.475 0.477 
  0.317 0.314 0.312 0.319 0.317 0.316 
Voted Elections  0.103 0.099 0.114 0.094 0.100 0.122 
  0.194 0.194 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.194 
Police Presencet-1  -0.143 -0.127 -0.157 -0.136 -0.144 -0.153 
  0.257 0.260 0.257 0.256 0.257 0.257 
Protestt-1  0.281 0.279 0.282 0.267 0.285 0.266 
  0.269 0.265 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266 
 Expect Unfair Electiont-1  0.210 0.210 0.210 0.209 0.210 0.221 
  0.146 0.146 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.147 
Bad Living Conditiont-1  0.043 0.040 0.043 0.048 0.034 0.033 
  0.112 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 
SpLag Protest  0.681 0.707 0.666 0.699 0.687 0.689 
  0.500 0.499 0.498 0.497 0.502 0.496 
Polling Stations (log)  -0.325* -0.323* -0.324* -0.328* -0.327* -0.326* 
  0.159 0.158 0.159 0.160 0.160 0.160 
Constant  -1.779* -1.783* -2.068* -1.739+ -1.587+ -1.746+ 
  0.905 0.898 0.923 0.902 0.904 0.903 
Observations  1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
AIC  1199.454 1198.531 1197.356 1197.843 1198.417 1197.295 
BIC  1292.237 1291.314 1290.139 1290.626 1291.200 1290.078 
Standard errors clustered on LGA in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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A1 Validation of Protest Participation 
The dependent variable in our manuscript codes whether Afrobarometer respondents 
participated in one or more protests in the past year, thus not establishing whether concerns 
about the electoral process mobilized respondents. Since we do not have individual-level data 
on election-related protesting, we instead present a validation using observational data from 
the Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) project (AUTHOR). The ECAV data include 
election-related contentious events before, during, and after elections in all unconsolidated 
regimes as reported in newswires. We identify and geolocate all protest-related events from 
election-day until three months after elections (ECAV covers a three-month period after 
elections). The data cover protests and riots in cities such as Lagos, Kano, Abuja, Port Harcourt, 
but also include events affecting entire states (Ekiti, Kano, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers) or regions 
(especially in the South). Since some events affect larger areas, we aggregate them to the level 
of states (we exclude those affecting all of Nigeria). Our data consist of 235 state-level events.27 
We present two validations. First, we correlate individual protest participation and observed 
electoral protest. Second, we correlate individual fraud perceptions with observational data on 
election protest. 
A1.1 Correlating Individual Protest Participation and Electoral Protest 
Figure A1.1 shows the correlation between the state-level share of Afrobarometer respondents 
claiming they protested and the number of protests events after elections. The correlation is 
moderate and positive. Controlling for population density to account for potential bias in 
newswire reporting, inferential results show a statistically significant, positive relationship 
                                                 
27 We identify 145 unique events, 12 of which affected either all or some Southern Nigerian states. We 
disaggregate these into a protest event for each affected state.  
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(Model A1.1, Table A1). Participation in protests reported in Afrobarometer thus correlates 
with election-related protest occurrence.  
 
 
Figure A1.1: Scatterplot of Afrobarometer protesting and ECAV contention by state 
 
 
A1.2 Correlating Individual Fraud Perception and Electoral Protest 
Our main empirical findings show a positive association between fraud perceptions and 
protesting at the individual level. Consistent with these findings, the same positive correlation 
exists between the share of respondents perceiving fraud and observational data on electoral 
protest events. Figure A1.2 plots the correlation between fraud perception and protests, while 
model A1.2 presents inferential results.  These results show that more electoral protesting 
occurred in states where a larger percentage of Afrobarometer respondents perceived 
irregularities. 
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Figure A1.2: Scatterplot of Afrobarometer fraud perception and ECAV contention by 
state 
 
 
Table A1. Correlating protesting and perceived fraud to electoral protest events 
 Model A1.1 
DV: % of Protesting 
Model A1.2 
DV: % of Fraud 
Perception 
ECAV Events 0.003+ 0.006* 
 0.002 0.003 
Population Density -0.00004 0.00005 
 0.00003 0.0001 
Constant 0.151* 0.605* 
 0.024 0.031 
   
Observations 37 37 
AIC -52.046 -37.167 
BIC -47.213 -32.334 
Standard errors clustered on states in parentheses  
* p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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A2 Additional Validation of Reported Fraud  
A.2.1 Full Results for Trust in INEC (figure 2) 
In Figure 2 of the manuscript, we presented the results of six models where we validate our 
measure of reported fraud by regressing reported fraud on citizen trust in the Nigerian Election 
Commission (INEC). Table A2.1 shows the estimated coefficients for all variables in the 
models shown in Figure 2.  
One concern with this exercise is that respondents more distant from fraud incidents 
could have lower trust in institutions in general. In additional robustness tests not shown, we 
investigated whether trust for courts of law and local councils is lower for individuals closer to 
fraud incidents. If our validation exercise is correct, observed fraud will specifically decrease 
trust toward INEC rather than other institutions not involved in the election process. Results 
showed that observed fraud does not affect trust toward courts of law and local council, as we 
would expect (results not shown).   
In two additional validation exercises presented below, we show that reported fraud 
also correlates with other expected outcomes based on observational data. First, we show that 
areas with reported election-day fraud are less likely to receive development aid in the year 
after (A.2.2). Second, we establish that areas with pre-election violence in the six months 
before elections are more likely to experience election-day reported fraud. (A2.3) Since both 
analyses correlate reported fraud with other observational data, we use more aggregate units of 
analysis (LGAs and states, respectively).  
Finally, we examine whether findings for reported fraud are conditional on respondent 
settlement type (A2.4).   
 47 
Table A2.1 Trust in INEC 
 Model 
V1 
Model 
V2 
Model 
V3 
Model 
V4 
Model 
V5 
Model 
V6 
 
 
DV: 
Trust 
INEC 
DV: 
Trust 
INEC 
DV: 
Trust 
INEC 
DV: 
Trust 
INEC 
DV: 
Trust 
INEC 
DV: 
Trust 
INEC 
Perceived Fraud -0.812* -0.807* -0.798* -0.754* -0.741* -0.797* 
 0.163 0.163 0.164 0.168 0.168 0.166 
Fraud Incident 
<=5km 
-0.448+      
 0.242      
Fraud Incident 
<=10km 
 -0.424*     
  0.204     
Fraud Incident 
<=20km 
  -0.459*    
   0.174    
Avg. Distance 3 
Incidents 
   0.007*   
    0.002   
Avg. Distance 5 
Incidents 
    0.006*  
     0.002  
Distance Closest 
Incident 
     0.007* 
      0.003 
Not Observed -0.266 -0.289 -0.336 -0.500+ -0.401 -0.269 
 0.243 0.248 0.246 0.281 0.267 0.237 
Age 0.010+ 0.009+ 0.010+ 0.010+ 0.010+ 0.009 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Urban Respondent -0.110 -0.101 -0.064 -0.042 -0.046 -0.086 
 0.170 0.170 0.173 0.169 0.168 0.170 
Access Electricity -0.073 -0.052 -0.066 -0.012 -0.044 -0.022 
 0.251 0.249 0.241 0.242 0.245 0.255 
Voted Elections -0.158 -0.145 -0.163 -0.179 -0.177 -0.164 
 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.151 0.150 0.150 
Police Presence t-1 0.363+ 0.399+ 0.386+ 0.429+ 0.426+ 0.392+ 
 0.218 0.224 0.218 0.223 0.227 0.224 
 Expect Unfair 
Election t-1 
0.052 0.024 0.049 0.082 0.087 0.060 
 0.116 0.119 0.116 0.122 0.124 0.120 
Bad Living Condition 
t-1 
-0.077 -0.062 -0.064 -0.101 -0.109 -0.070 
 0.108 0.110 0.109 0.114 0.117 0.111 
Loser Vote -0.129 -0.128 -0.116 -0.151 -0.136 -0.135 
 0.139 0.137 0.134 0.138 0.137 0.137 
Community member 0.050 0.041 0.041 0.076 0.093 0.059 
 0.149 0.150 0.150 0.152 0.152 0.150 
Radio News -0.156 -0.168 -0.163 -0.189 -0.183 -0.179 
 0.153 0.151 0.152 0.153 0.154 0.151 
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Polling Stations (log) -0.021 -0.012 -0.055 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002 
 0.139 0.139 0.131 0.138 0.137 0.137 
Constant -0.051 -0.057 0.205 -0.763 -0.714 -0.514 
 0.728 0.720 0.697 0.778 0.757 0.780 
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
AIC 1606.309 1605.343 1601.704 1593.367 1593.908 1600.158 
BIC 1683.628 1682.662 1679.023 1670.686 1671.227 1677.477 
Standard errors clustered on LGA in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
A2.2 Correlating Development Aid and Election-day Fraud 
Existing research suggests that the incidence of election fraud could be sanctioned with lower 
provision of foreign aid. Portela (2007) finds that aid suspensions occur when the democratic 
process is disrupted, and Donno (2010) similarly shows that IGOs punish states guilty of 
electoral misconduct. To establish the correlation between reported fraud and aid, we use data 
on aid projects committed to Nigeria in 2008 from AidData (Tierney et al. 2011; Findley, 
Nielson, and Powell 2011). Since the data do not always provide location information at the 
LGA level, we aggregate the total amount of aid committed in 2008 to the level of Nigerian 
states, resulting in 37 observations. Figure A2.2 shows that states where fraud incidents were 
reported by the EU receive less aid in the year after elections. Table A2.2 also shows a simple 
count model at the state level where we control for how much aid was committed in 2007. We 
decide not to include variables from Afrobarometer data at the state level because aggregating 
more than 2,000 individual responses across 37 states would not be very meaningful. 
Consistent with our expectations, less development aid is committed to states that recorded 
substantial incidence of fraud, even while controlling for previous aid provision. 
 
 
Figure A2.2 Scatterplot of fraud reported and aid commitments by state 
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Table A2.2 Correlating development aid to reported fraud 
 Model A1.1 
DV: Count of Reported Fraud by State 
Reported Fraud (count) -0.039* 
 0.011 
Aid Committed in 2007 0.144 
 0.091 
Constant 17.449* 
 0.394 
 0.307 
Observations 31 
AIC 945.229 
BIC 950.965 
Standard errors clustered on states in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.1  
 
 
A2.3 Correlating Pre-Election Violence and Election-Day Reported Fraud 
Our measure of reported fraud consists of incidents occurring on election-day in the 2007 
Nigerian elections, and this measurement is more credible if we can establish that electoral 
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manipulation in the run-up to elections correlates with election-day fraud. We measure pre-
election manipulation with data on pre-election violence collected from Nigeria Watch.28 The 
use of violence is arguably one of the major forms of pre-electoral manipulation (Straus and 
Taylor 2009). Nigeria Watch collects data on deadly violent events from government 
authorities, NGOs, 10 national newspapers, and other sources. The data include date, location 
information, number of deaths, actors involved, and a description of each event. We manually 
coded all events relating to elections for the six months before the April 14, 2007 elections, 
which produced 102 events with 309 deaths.29 The scatterplot below (figure A2.3) shows the 
expected positive correlation between pre-election violent deaths and election-day fraud at the 
state level, omitting the three states without fraud reporting from the EU.  
  
                                                 
28 http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php  
29 To identify events, we selected events relating to political issues for the six months prior to elections and 
assessed each event on whether violence was related to elections. See for example this event in Oregun on April 
2, 2007: “PDP thugs invaded AC rally, killing one and injured [sic] five others.” 
http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=1520&rang=17  
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Figure A2.3: Scatterplot of pre-election deaths and election-day fraud by state 
  
We also specify a count model with the count of election-day fraud events in each LGA as the 
dependent variable, the number of pre-election deaths in each LGA as the key independent 
variable, and some controls from Afrobarometer round 3.5. The unit of analysis are the 234 
LGAs for which we had respondents in Afrobarometer round 3.5. Table A2.3 shows a positive 
and significant coefficient for pre-election violence, indicating that pre-election manipulation 
correlates strongly with election-day fraud. This result helps establish the validity of our 
reported fraud indicator.  
The pre-election violence analyses help address two additional concerns with regard to 
our reported fraud measure. First, the positive correlation between pre-election violence and 
election-day fraud helps reduce concerns regarding the limitation of our measurement to 
election-day. As an additional test (available on request), we also re-specified our main models 
with the measure of pre-election violent events. Consistent with our main models, we found no 
empirical relationship between reported pre-election violence and protesting, while our finding 
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for fraud perceptions remains positive and significant. Second, while we examine possible 
selection bias in fraud reporting in more detail below, the positive relationship between pre-
election deaths and election-day reported fraud shows that observers were more likely to report 
fraud in areas experience violence in the run-up to elections.  
 
Table A2.3 Correlating pre-election deaths and election-day reported fraud 
 Model A2.3 
DV: Count of Reported Fraud 
Pre-Election Deaths (count) 0.056* 
 (0.018) 
Electricity 0.568 
 (0.373) 
Urban 0.864* 
 (0.334) 
Vote 0.921 
 (0.852) 
Age -0.009 
 (0.038) 
Radio 1.354* 
 (0.670) 
Protest 0.537 
 (0.676) 
Fraud Perception, 2003 elections -0.148 
 (0.692) 
State Not Observed -1.819* 
 (0.905) 
Observations 234 
AIC 603.161 
BIC 641.170 
Clustered standard errors 
in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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A 2.4 Interacting Reported Fraud with Respondent Settlement Type 
 
A concern for our proximity to fraud measure is that the effect of proximity could be influenced 
by respondent’s settlement type. Information about fraud may spread more rapidly in sparsely 
populated areas. We specify a model of protesting in which we interact urban respondents and 
different measure of proximity to observed fraud. Table A.2.4 shows that the two component 
terms (proximity to fraud and urban area) do not predict mobilization, but their interaction 
does. Counterintuitively, respondents in urban areas who are close to a fraud incident are more 
likely to join protests, and this result holds for some (5km and 20 km), but not all (the second 
model), alternative measures of fraud proximity. Importantly, the positive effect of perceived 
fraud still holds in this model. We suspect that the interaction effect for urban respondents 
might be the result of dynamics similar to our finding for community membership. Recall that 
we find a positive, weakly significant effect of proximity to fraud for individuals belonging to 
community associations. When we estimate a simple model of community membership (not 
shown), those in urban areas are more likely to be members, showing some support for this 
intuition.  
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Table A2.4: Interaction Proximity to Fraud and  Urban Respondents 
 Fraud 
incident 
5km 
Fraud incident 
10km 
Fraud incident 
20km 
 (2) (3) (4) 
Variables    
Perceived Fraud 0.360* 0.367* 0.359+ 
 0.183 0.184 0.184 
Fraud incident  -0.315 -0.409 -0.370 
 0.328 0.276 0.252 
Fraud incident# Urban 1.088* 0.570 0.829* 
 0.431 0.391 0.370 
Urban Respondent=1 -0.391 -0.267 -0.492+ 
 0.241 0.250 0.275 
Radio News 0.182 0.182 0.186 
 0.184 0.184 0.184 
Community member 0.928* 0.924* 0.919* 
 0.194 0.191 0.189 
Loser Vote -0.366* -0.389* -0.383* 
 0.168 0.166 0.167 
Not observed 0.583* 0.460* 0.544* 
 0.240 0.233 0.233 
Age 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Access Electricity 0.472 0.523+ 0.541+ 
 0.320 0.312 0.309 
Voted Elections 0.107 0.107 0.110 
 0.193 0.195 0.195 
Police Presence t-1 -0.211 -0.178 -0.206 
 0.254 0.257 0.256 
Protest t-1 0.423 0.362 0.356 
 0.260 0.272 0.276 
 Expect Unfair Election t-1 0.162 0.192 0.206 
 0.150 0.151 0.148 
Bad Living Condition t-1 0.051 0.044 0.043 
 0.110 0.109 0.108 
SpLag Protest 0.733 0.808 0.721 
 0.484 0.516 0.508 
Polling stations (log) -0.335* -0.282+ -0.298+ 
 0.158 0.156 0.157 
Constant -1.669+ -1.958* -1.833* 
 0.890 0.870 0.872 
N 1279 1279 1279 
AIC 1187.764 1195.892 1192.189 
BIC 1280.533 1288.661 1284.958 
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A3 Distribution of polling stations in the 2007 Nigerian elections 
Our main indicator of reported fraud measures whether incidents occurred within 5km of a 
respondent. The manuscript discusses the selection of this threshold with regard to the number 
and distribution of polling stations in Nigeria. The manuscript also employs alternative 
thresholds (10 and 20km) and distance-based measures. Figure A3.1 illustrates proximity and 
distance-based measures of reported fraud. Diagram A (left panel) shows the number of polling 
stations for a 5, 10, and 20 km threshold. Diagram B (right panel) illustrates various distance-
based measures.  
 
Figure A3.1: Selection of kilometre threshold for proximity to fraud measure  
 
In figure A3.2, we present maps of all polling stations (left panel), and the density of stations 
in the vicinity of survey respondents (right panel).    
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Figure A3.2 Location of polling station (left) and density of polling stations (right). 
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A4 Selection Bias in Fraud Reporting 
We next explore possible selection bias in EU observers’ reporting of fraud. The manuscript 
already mentions that the EU did not report fraud in three states where observers could not be 
deployed for security reasons. We include a dummy variable for these states in empirical 
models to account for non-observation of these areas. Yet it is possible that the EU also failed 
to survey conflictual areas in states where they did deploy some observers, thus excluding areas 
with fraud and this selection bias driving the lack of significant findings. We consider this bias 
somewhat unlikely because the EU report includes information on more than 600 events, 
including events reported by domestic organizations, journalists, and witness reports. 
Nevertheless, we examine this concern in more depth because research on the deployment of 
election observers suggests some evidence of selection bias (Bader and Schmeets 2014). In 
these models, we use LGAs as units since our independent and dependent variable are based 
observational data. We cannot directly model the deployment of election observers because we 
only have information on where they detected fraud rather than all areas visited. However, we 
estimate logistic regression models to at least examine whether fraud reporting seems 
influenced by violence. Our dependent variable is coded 1 if fraud was reported in an LGA, 0 
otherwise. To measure the effect of conflict on reporting, we use data on conflict events for 
each LGA from ACLED for the year before the April 2007 elections (Raleigh et al. 2010). 
ACLED conflict events include battles, one-sided violence, and riots. We also include some 
control variables by averaging individual characteristics across LGAs. If selection bias is a 
concern, the coefficient for ACLED events should be negative and significant, suggesting a 
lower probability of reporting in such areas. In model A4.2, we aggregate all ACLED events, 
whereas A4.4-A4.6 distinguish among different types of ACLED events. Models in table A3 
do not suggest selection bias because the ACLED coefficients remain insignificant in all 
specifications. Notice that in model A4.6, the riot variable is dropped because only two riot 
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events occurs in LGAs sampled by Afrobarometer and both reported observed fraud. Riots are 
thus excluded as they perfectly predict the dependent variable. Interestingly, and confirming 
other findings on deployment decisions (Bader and Schmeets 2014), we find that LGAs with 
more urban respondents are more likely to report fraud.  
Table A4. Selection Bias: Logit models with Reported Fraud as DV 
 Model 
A4.1 
Model 
A4.2 
Model 
A4.4 
Model 
A4.5 
Model 
A4.6 
 Baseline All 
ACLED 
events 
Battle-
events 
One-sided 
violence 
Riots 
ACLED Events  -0.016    
  0.053    
Battle-events   0.151   
   0.229   
One-sided Violence Events    -0.089  
    0.070  
Riots     0.000 
     . 
Age (mean) 0.054+ 0.053 0.055+ 0.052 0.051 
 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Urban (mean) 0.596+ 0.594 0.599+ 0.591 0.582 
 0.361 0.361 0.363 0.360 0.365 
Access to Electricity (mean) 1.275+ 1.268+ 1.285+ 1.252+ 1.279+ 
 0.664 0.664 0.671 0.661 0.668 
Police Presence (mean) -0.550 -0.538 -0.600 -0.529 -0.700 
 0.500 0.501 0.509 0.501 0.512 
Protests (mean) 0.104 0.121 0.045 0.148 -0.004 
 0.492 0.501 0.499 0.503 0.494 
Expect Unfair Elections (mean) 0.227 0.227 0.234 0.232 0.283 
 0.265 0.265 0.266 0.264 0.262 
Bad Living Conditions (mean) 0.131 0.123 0.152 0.109 0.156 
 0.234 0.239 0.234 0.240 0.235 
Polling Stations (log) 0.661+ 0.673+ 0.629+ 0.697+ 0.589+ 
 0.362 0.374 0.365 0.376 0.358 
Constant -8.219* -8.252* -8.127* -8.311* -7.778* 
 2.299 2.328 2.292 2.353 2.268 
Observations 231 231 231 231 229 
AIC 238.186 240.131 239.718 239.586 234.003 
BIC 269.168 274.555 274.142 274.010 264.907 
Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses 
     
* p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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A5 Construction of Round 3.5 Control Variables 
Afrobarometer does not survey the same individuals over time, which makes controlling for 
historical factors challenging. Yet when including e.g. police presence as an independent 
variable to explain protesting, concerns over simultaneity bias are substantial. One possible 
solution is to average survey responses across larger geographical units. Yet since the survey 
also does not select individuals from the same administrative units over time, even a more 
aggregate approach becomes challenging. In 2007, Afrobarometer sampled 2,410 respondents 
from 237 LGAs out of 775; in 2008, the sample included 2,325 respondents from 230 LGAs. 
On average, both rounds surveyed 10 individuals in each selected LGA. However, only 99 of 
the sampled LGAs in 2008 (round 4) were also included in the 2007 survey (round 3.5). We 
hence use the following, three-step procedure to control for historical variables at a more 
aggregate level: 
1. Identify LGAs surveyed in both round 4 and round 3.5 
2. For LGAs in both rounds, assign aggregated values of control variable x from round 
3.5 to 4 (equivalent to a lagged variable at the LGA level) 
3. For LGA in round 4 that are not surveyed in 3.5, calculate the spatial lag of LGAs 
in round 4 using neighbouring units that are sampled in 3.5 and then assign the 
spatially lagged control variable x to round 4. 
The map in Figure A5 exemplifies the procedure. Suppose we want to assign previous living 
conditions at the LGA level from the 3.5 round. The LGA of Ogori/Magongo is sampled in 
round 4, but not in 3.5 meaning that we cannot add information about living conditions at the 
LGA level. We know, however, that two neighboring LGAs (Akoko-Ed and Okene) were 
sampled in round 3.5, thus calculate average living conditions in these LGAs and use these 
values to obtain the spatial lag of living conditions for Ogori/Magongo. 
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Figure A5. Map of LGAs sampled in round 4 and 3.5 of Afrobarometer 
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A6 Additional Models of Protesting 
In this section we present three additional models of protesting as robustness tests. These tests 
account for interactions between perceived and observed fraud (table A6.1), control for non-
electoral grievances (table A6.2), models at the LGA level (table A6.3), and models that 
distinguish reported fraud by type (table A6.4). 
A6.1 Interacting Perceived and Reported Fraud 
Table A6.1 presents results for possible conditional effects of perceived and observed fraud by 
adding interaction terms. We assess these interactions because proximity to fraud could 
amplify fraud perceptions (or vice versa). We interact fraud perception with all 
operationalizations of reported fraud shown in Figure 5 of the manuscript. In the five models 
below, the interaction term is never statistically significant at 0.05 level, thus not providing 
support for claims that proximity to fraud impacts perception indirectly (or vice versa). In 
model A6.1.4, the interaction is significant at the 90% confidence level but negative, thus not 
showing that perception and proximity to fraud reinforce each other. When plotting substantive 
effects for this model (not shown), furthermore, the interaction is not statistically significant 
since it is not possible to discern the effect of proximity to fraud conditional on perception.  
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Table A6.1 Models with interaction between perceived and reported fraud 
 Model 
A6.1.1 
Model 
A6.1.2 
Model 
A6.1.3 
Model 
A6.1.4 
Model 
A6.1.5 
 
 
Dummy  
5km 
Dummy  
10km 
Avg dist 3 Avg dist 5 Distance 
closest 
Perceived Fraud 0.324+ 0.361+ 0.634* 0.707* 0.572* 
 0.193 0.198 0.258 0.257 0.227 
Reported Fraud 0.331 0.080 0.004 0.004* 0.008+ 
 0.267 0.259 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Perceived*Reported -0.114 -0.223 -0.005 -0.005+ -0.008 
 0.312 0.314 0.003 0.003 0.006 
Not Observed 0.635* 0.534* 0.532* 0.523* 0.551* 
 0.199 0.198 0.220 0.205 0.189 
Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Urban Respondent -0.138 -0.091 -0.118 -0.111 -0.106 
 0.177 0.177 0.182 0.183 0.179 
Access Electricity 0.419 0.441+ 0.443+ 0.440+ 0.490+ 
 0.271 0.268 0.264 0.262 0.257 
Voted Elections 0.219 0.226 0.211 0.211 0.215 
 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 
Police Presence t-1 -0.073 -0.102 -0.057 -0.049 -0.093 
 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.228 
Protest t-1 0.448* 0.463* 0.469* 0.487* 0.486* 
 0.219 0.226 0.225 0.227 0.230 
Expect Unfair 
Election t-1 
0.130 0.159 0.146 0.143 0.149 
 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.113 0.115 
Bad Living Condition 
t-1 
-0.028 -0.031 -0.041 -0.046 -0.040 
 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.094 
SpLag Protest 0.728 0.780+ 0.805+ 0.809+ 0.837+ 
 0.459 0.471 0.460 0.459 0.463 
Polling Stations (log) -0.318* -0.306* -0.299* -0.300* -0.281* 
 0.114 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.109 
Constant -1.418* -1.501* -1.769* -1.849* -1.906* 
 0.674 0.663 0.665 0.665 0.661 
Observations 2092 2092 2092 2092 2092 
AIC 1842.706 1844.809 1842.068 1840.493 1840.519 
BIC 1927.394 1929.497 1926.756 1925.181 1925.207 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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A6.2 Controlling for Economic, Ethnic, and Political Grievances 
Table A6.2 presents models of protesting while controlling for other grievances that could 
affect fraud perceptions. Instead of capturing citizens’ perception of election fraud, fraud 
perceptions could reflect economic, ethnic, or political grievances that could contaminate our 
measurement. We create several variables from the Afrobarometer survey to measure these 
grievances and include them as controls in table A6.2 below. First, individuals who are 
unemployed may hold economic grievances that also predispose them to hold fraud 
perceptions. We create a dummy variable coded 1 for those without employment, 0 otherwise. 
Second, individuals belonging to excluded ethnic groups might have grievances against the 
government that could also make them amenable to perceive elections as fraudulent. We 
include a dummy variable coded 1 for individuals who belong to excluded ethnic groups as 
defined by the Ethnic Power Relations data (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), 0 otherwise. 
Third, general dissatisfaction with the status of democracy could influence fraud perceptions, 
and these more general grievances could thus be responsible for the effect of fraud perception 
on protesting. We create a dummy variable coded 1 for individuals dissatisfied with democracy 
in Nigeria, 0 otherwise. Results in the table show that fraud perception has a positive and 
significant effect on protesting while controlling for these grievances, which increases our 
confidence that our findings indeed capture the effect of fraud perception rather than other 
grievances. An alternative model specification included trust in government as measure of 
political grievances. In this model (not reported), results for fraud perception remained 
consistent with those reported in model A6.2. 
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Table A6.2 Model Controlling for Economic, Ethnic, and Political Grievances 
 Model A6.2 
 Other Grievances 
  
Perceived Fraud 0.511* 
 0.253 
Fraud Incident <=5km 0.210 
 0.322 
Unemployed -0.247 
 0.202 
Discriminated or Powerless Ethnic Group  0.379 
 0.454 
Dissatisfied with Democracy 0.016 
 0.240 
Radio News 0.030 
 0.243 
Community Member 1.026* 
 0.261 
Loser Vote -0.432+ 
 0.236 
Not Observed 0.184 
 0.458 
Age 0.006 
 0.008 
Urban Respondent -0.272 
 0.285 
Access Electricity 0.395 
 0.531 
Voted Elections -0.181 
 0.236 
Police Presence t-1 -0.373 
 0.339 
Protest t-1 0.334 
 0.395 
Expect Unfair Election t-1 0.259 
 0.211 
Bad Living Condition t-1 0.120 
 0.151 
SpLag Protest 0.672 
 0.670 
Polling stations (log) -0.236 
 0.227 
Constant -1.982 
 1.388 
Observations 848 
AIC 776.059 
BIC 870.916 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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A6.3 LGAs as units of analyses 
Table 6.3 reports a model estimated at the LGA level instead of individual respondents. We 
aggregate the variables at the LGA levels using the mean. For reported fraud, we both use the 
mean of the dummy for incidents occurring within 5 km and a dummy that equals 1 if at least 
one or more incidents occurred in the LGA. The former variable captures the proportion of 
respondents within that LGA that were very proximate to reported incidents, while the latter 
captures the presence or absence of fraud in each LGA. We include the margin of victory for 
each state for the winning party from the 2003 elections to control for the effect of electoral 
competition. For these models, we aggregate all Afrobarometer variables to the LGA level and 
replicate our baseline model (model 3 in the manuscript). Both models show positive and 
significant coefficients for perceived fraud but not reported fraud, which is again in line with 
the main models presented in the manuscript.  
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Table A6.3 Model with LGA as Unit of Analysis 
 Model A6.3.1 
LGA Baseline 
Model A6.3.2 
LGA Baseline with LGA 
dummy 
Perceived Fraud 0.151* 0.149* 
 0.051 0.051 
Fraud Incident <=5km (mean) 0.018  
 0.026  
Dummy Reported LGA  0.021 
  0.025 
Not Observed 0.077* 0.079* 
 0.036 0.036 
Age (mean) 0.002 0.002 
 0.003 0.003 
Urban Respondent (mean) -0.043 -0.045+ 
 0.026 0.026 
Access Electricity (mean) 0.049 0.051 
 0.039 0.039 
Voted Elections (mean) -0.043 -0.047 
 0.058 0.058 
Police Presence t-1 (mean) -0.023 -0.023 
 0.033 0.033 
Protest t-1 (mean) 0.081* 0.080* 
 0.031 0.031 
Expect Unfair Election t-1 (mean) -0.003 -0.004 
 0.016 0.016 
Bad Living Condition t-1 (mean) 0.003 0.003 
 0.013 0.013 
SpLag Protest (mean) 0.088 0.088 
 0.073 0.073 
Victory Margin -0.010 -0.010 
 0.013 0.013 
Constant 0.027 0.027 
 0.151 0.150 
Observations 229 229 
AIC -135.285 -135.498 
BIC -87.213 -87.425 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10   
 
 
A6.4 Distinguishing Types of Fraud 
Table A6.4 presents additional operationalizations of the reported fraud measure. In the three 
models, we replicate the baseline model of the manuscript but distinguish incidents reported 
by EU observers within each LGA by type. The three different types of incidents in the report 
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are procedural breaches (type 1), violence (type 2) and ballot stuffing (type 3). None of the 
types affect individuals’ likelihood to protest, while perceived fraud consistently increases the 
odds of mobilization.  
 
Table A6.4 Reported Fraud by Type. 
 Model A6.4.1 Model A6.4.2 Model A6.4.3 
 Type 1 only Type 2 only Type 3 only 
Perceived Fraud 0.409* 0.396* 0.396* 
 0.183 0.183 0.183 
Fraud Incident <= 5km 0.425+ 0.216 -0.187 
 0.241 0.265 0.378 
Radio News 0.188 0.185 0.176 
 0.183 0.184 0.184 
Loser Vote -0.394* -0.402* -0.413* 
 0.162 0.164 0.161 
Community Member 0.937* 0.938* 0.935* 
 0.193 0.193 0.191 
Age 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Urban Respondent -0.108 -0.118 -0.079 
 0.213 0.216 0.215 
Access Electricity 0.519+ 0.529+ 0.541+ 
 0.308 0.307 0.306 
Voted Elections 0.103 0.084 0.091 
 0.193 0.193 0.193 
Police Presence t-1 -0.163 -0.110 -0.124 
 0.261 0.257 0.257 
Protest t-1 0.348 0.389 0.368 
 0.259 0.254 0.262 
 Expect Unfair Election t-1 0.260+ 0.228 0.252+ 
 0.144 0.145 0.145 
Bad Living Condition t-1 0.053 0.035 0.041 
 0.117 0.115 0.115 
SpLag Protest 0.898+ 0.890+ 0.867+ 
 0.483 0.474 0.483 
Polling Stations (log) -0.343* -0.313* -0.297+ 
 0.157 0.156 0.155 
Constant -1.830* -1.941* -2.029* 
 0.880 0.876 0.869 
Observations 1280 1280 1280 
AIC 1200.395 1201.896 1202.393 
BIC 1282.869 1284.369 1284.867 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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A6.5 Extended baseline model with more individual-level controls 
Table A6.5 reports an extended version of the baseline model presented in the manuscript. In 
particular, we replicate Model 3 with the inclusion of additional control variables at the 
individual level. Individuals’ general propensity to participate to protest can be a function of 
their income level and education, so we include these two variables in the specification. With 
regard to income, we would expect it to be related to mobilization in presence of perceived 
economic grievances and inequalities, which we control for in models presented in section 
A6.2 without noticing any significant change in our main results. Afrobarometer does not 
directly measure the level of income for respondents, but asks them whether they had run out 
of a cash income in the last year. The answer is on an ordinal scale from 0 (Never) to 4 
(Always). Education is measured more precisely ranging from no formal schooling (0) to post-
graduate education (9). Controlling for these factors does not affect the positive and significant 
coefficient for perceived fraud; as in other models, reported fraud does not reach statistical 
significance, while perception remains positive and significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6.5. Extended Baseline model with Income and Education 
 Model A6.5 
 Extended Baseline 
Variables  
Perceived Fraud 0.385* 
 0.187 
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Fraud incident <=5km 0.301 
 0.240 
Income -0.050 
 0.064 
Education 0.001 
 0.012 
Radio News 0.168 
 0.187 
Community member 0.938* 
 0.194 
Loser Vote -0.350* 
 0.168 
Not observed 0.636* 
 0.238 
Age 0.005 
 0.006 
Urban Respondent -0.134 
 0.204 
Access Electricity 0.452 
 0.314 
Voted Elections 0.107 
 0.195 
Police Presence t-1 -0.141 
 0.257 
Protest t-1 0.280 
 0.267 
 Expect Unfair Election t-1 0.198 
 0.145 
Bad Living Condition t-1 0.045 
 0.111 
SpLag Protest 0.676 
 0.501 
Polling stations (log) -0.330* 
 0.160 
Constant -1.695+ 
 0.914 
Observations 1279 
AIC 1197.468 
BIC 1295.391 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10   
  
 
 
 
A7 Generalization 
Our empirical results for the 2007 elections in Nigeria show that reported fraud has no effect 
on mobilization, while fraud perceptions strongly and consistently affect protesting. While the 
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manuscript and the above sections try to account for a number of threats to causal inference, in 
particular for our reported fraud measure, a remaining concern is whether these results hold 
outside of Nigeria and this particular election. We cannot conduct additional tests of our 
findings for reported fraud because subnationally disaggregated data of fraud are not available. 
However, it is straightforward to assess whether our findings for fraud perception and 
protesting are generalizable. Table A7 shows results for models of all respondents surveyed in 
Afrobarometer rounds 1, 3 and 4 (round 2 did not ask about fraud perceptions) together with 
some basic controls. The logit models for all countries show that perception of fraud 
consistently predicts higher odds of protesting for individuals across the entire sample, 
demonstrating the generalizability of our fraud perceptions findings. In the logit model, we do 
not cluster standard errors by country because of the small number of clusters. Yet results from 
the Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed model (A7.2), which allows the specification of 
clusters for observations (country-round), show that the effect of fraud perception remains 
consistent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7. Models with respondents from all Afrobarometer rounds 
 Model A7.1 Model A7.2 
Variables Logit model GLLAMM models 
Perceived Fraud 0.091* 0.050+ 
 0.029 0.027 
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Age -0.003* -0.002* 
 0.001 0.000 
Urban 0.064* 0.120* 
 0.031 0.029 
Electricity 0.361* 0.250* 
 0.031 0.031 
Voted 0.197* 0.238* 
 0.034 0.031 
Constant -2.188* -2.410* 
 0.063 0.056 
Observations 54957 54957 
AIC 36414.867 44299.132 
BIC 36468.353 44361.532 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10   
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A8 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A8. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Protest 2,225 .171 .376 0 1 
Perceived Fraud 2,1 .673 .469 0 1 
Fraud Incidents <=5km 2,225 .220 .414 0 1 
Fraud Incidents <=10km 2,225 .310 .462 0 1 
Fraud Incidents <=20km 2,225 .447 .497 0 1 
Avg. Distance 3 Closest 
Fraud 2,225 62.773 47.287 .079 208.627 
Avg. Distance 5 Closest 
Fraud 2,225 69.957 51.757 .274 235.342 
Distance Closest Fraud 2,225 33.885 35.086 .013 197.702 
Radio 2,225 .586 .492 0 1 
Community 2,211 .586 .492 0 1 
Loser Vote 1,345 .570 .495 0 1 
Age 2,216 31.336 11.464 18 86 
Urban 2,225 .503 .500 0 1 
Access Electricity 2,225 .601 .489 0 1 
Voted Elections 2,224 .902 .296 0 1 
Police Presence 2,225 .315 .402 0 1 
Expect Unfair Elections 2,225 1.039 .741 0 3 
Bad Living Conditions 2,225 1.152 .859 0 3.5 
SpLag Protest 2,225 .465 .424 0 1 
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